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Abstract
Recently, the area of study of spatial game continuously has extended, and researchers have especially presented a lot of
works of coevolutionary mechanism. We have recognized coevolutionary mechanism as one of the factors for the promotion of
cooperation like ﬁve rules by Nowak. However, those studies still deal with the optimal response (best decision). The best
decision is persuasive in most cases, but does not apply to all situations in the real world. Contemplating that question,
researchers have presented some works discussing not only the best decision but also the second-best decision. Those
studies compare the results between the best and the second-best, and also state the applicability of the second-best decision.
This study, considering that trend, has extended the match between two groups to spatial game with the second-best decision.
This extended model expresses relationships of groups as a spatial network, and every group matches other groups of
relationships. Then, we examine how mutual cooperation changes in each case where either we add probabilistic perturbation
to relationships or ties form various types of the structure. As a result, unlike most results utilizing the best decision,
probabilistic perturbation does not induce any change. On the other hand, when ties are the scale-free structure, mutual
cooperation is enhanced like the case of the best decision. When we probe the evolution of strategies in that case, groups with
many ties play a role for leading the direction of decision as a whole. This role appears without explicit assignment. In the
discussion, we also state that the presented model has an analogy to the real situation, collusive tendering.
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 Introduction
The topic of research how cooperation emerges under the situation of conﬂicts of interest has been a quite challenging theme.
Many researchers have managed to approach this question. Until now, we have regarded that ﬁve rules by Nowak (direct /
indirect / network reciprocity and kin / multilevel selection) (Nowak 2006) are effective for the emergence of cooperation in
pairwise interactions like the prisoner's dilemma game (abbreviated as PDG). On the other hand, in group interactions (i.e.
public goods game), punishment has been thought to have its effect on maintenance of cooperation (Fehr 2002; Fowler 2005;
Herrmann 2008; O'Gorman 2009; Rankin 2009). The effect of punishment on the promotion of cooperation is still disputable
(Fowler 2005; Dreber 2008; O'Gorman 2009; Rankin 2009).
In above factors facilitating cooperation, especially regarding network reciprocity, there are some cases for the development
of cooperation when relationships of players are the small world structure (Watts 1999; Masuda 2003). Also, some papers
have presented that ties of the scale-free effectively facilitate cooperation (Santos 2005; Santos 2006; Perc 2008; Santos
2008). Recently, coevolutionary mechanism where both strategies and relationships of players evolve has proved to be a
promotive factor for cooperation (Ebel 2002; Zimmermann 2004; Pacheco 2006;Poncela 2009; Szolnoki 2009; Van Segbroeck
2009; Perc 2010). In the coevolutionary mechanism, the difference of rates of evolution between strategy and structure is
crucial for the development of cooperation.
The practical problem for those many studies is that they all deal with the optimal response (best decision). Those
researchers at ﬁrst think about the theory of the survival of the ﬁttest by Darwin that individuals manage to maximize their
ﬁtness. Then, researchers are inclined to discuss why cooperation emerges and develops in that circumstance. On the other
hand, considering practical situations, there are many cases like negotiation that everyone intends to reach an agreement with








recognized that problem. Therefore, they have studied and discussed not only the best decision but also the second-best
decision (Rietveld 2007; Boergers 2009; Ohdaira 2009). Those studies based on the second-best decision describe the
comparison between the best and the second-best and also its applicability to real problems.
Considering that trend, we extend the model of the match between two groups with the second-best decision proposed by
Ohdaira et al. (Ohdaira 2009) to spatial game. In that case, groups play matches between the groups of relationships. Then,
while interactions are ordinarily pairwise in the PDG, we introduce the mechanism of two stages that matches are pairwise but
decision is the group level. It is similar to the system of multilevel selection, where matches are pairwise but selection is the
group level (Traulsen 2006). The reason why we employ that mechanism is because we aim at making stages of evolution
multiple and inducing its diversity.
Employing this constructed model, we examine how changes in the structure of network (topology) expressing relationships of
groups affect mutual cooperation. As a result, we cannot ﬁnd any difference between the cases of network with probabilistic
perturbation. On the contrary, when the network has the scale-free structure, mutual cooperation can be enhanced as well as
the results of the best decision (Santos 2005; Santos 2006; Perc 2008; Santos 2008). Investigating the case of the scale-free
structure in more detailed, the increase in the number of groups and the variation in the density of relationships do not produce
any changes. On the other hand, when the length of strategy of each group gets large, mutual cooperation cannot be easily
settled in comparison with the results of other parameters. This trend is similar to the one of the two groups model (Ohdaira
2009). In addition, when we examine how every group evolves his/her strategy, it is proved that groups with quite many
relationships (hub groups) determine the direction of decision as a whole and also promote the decision of groups after the
settlement of the direction. This role emerges without explicit assignment.
We will note descriptions in the following order. First, we brieﬂy explain the PDG with sequential strategy of the Ohdaira's
model. Next, the detail of the constructed model and the obtained results are exhibited. Then, we discuss both the results and
the applicability of the presented model. We explain how the presented model is analogous to the real situation by illustrating
the problem of collusive tendering. Finally, we will state concluding remarks.
 The Model
Brief description of the PDG with sequential strategy
The studies of the PDG generally adopt the framework that strategies do not transform themselves, i.e., each player mutually
refers to some pre-prepared strategies, and selects one strategy that is considered to be the most successful. Especially, the
studies of the iterated PDG designate strategy as response to past actions of others. Therefore, many researches focus the
point, what strategy within those prepared is the most increased and utilized by players, i.e., what the most successful
strategy is.
In this research, contrarily we adopt policy of not introducing the framework with explicit reference to other information. Each
player can only recognize strategies of opponents as the form of resulting average payoff, i.e., he/she cannot obtain the
perfect information of other strategies. Furthermore, we adopt the PDG with sequential strategy of Ohdaira et al. (Ohdaira
2006; Ohdaira 2007; Ohdaira 2009; Ohdaira 2011) where strategy describes multiple choices (ex. CCDDD, also see equation
(1)) rather than the typical PDG. Note that Ohdaira's studies except (Ohdaira 2009) utilize other types of decision, however
the framework of the game is all the same. We refer to “strategy” as not the patterns of reaction (ex. TFT, AllD, AllC) but the
sequential array itself for the PDG with sequential strategy as noted below.
We describe the basic feature of the PDG with sequential strategy of two groups (Ohdaira 2007; Ohdaira 2009; Ohdaira 2011)
as follows (also see Figure 1). There are two different groups which have n strategies respectively. Strategies of each group
have an ID u (from 1 to n). The strategy regulates behavior of group in each bout of PDG. All strategies are initialized as
random sequences. We can express every strategy of the group i, i.e., Si (u)as a sequential array whose length is L as the
equation (1). Each character represents strategy of one bout ( D: Defection, C: Cooperation). Where D or C means the
component vector, we express it as (0, 1) or (1, 0).
(1)
Each group plays the match of n rounds with the other group utilizing his/her strategy. At this time, he/she mutually presents
his/her holding strategy in turn. This order shall be loyal to each number of strategies ( u) as Figure 1. However, strategies
with the same ID are not similar because they independently change according to the decision of every group. After each
round, every group ﬁrst recognizes payoff of his/her presented strategy.
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Figure 1. Outline of the PDG with sequential strategy
We can numerically express each payoff of strategy of the group i at the generation g with the equation (2). The u -th strategy
of the group i has its payoff pij (u)against the group j. In that equation, A designates the payoff matrix of the standard iterated
PDG (Axelrod 1984), and where ʱi
k(u) and ʱj
k(u) each show the element of strategy of the equation (1). The reason why we
employ this payoff matrix is because the PDG with sequential strategy makes u times of rounds in a match, and is similar to
the mechanism of the iterated PDG as well. He/She can determine the trend of proposed strategies of others from each
resulting payoff. This information is reﬂected in the match of next generation.
(2)
After the match composed of n rounds, each group makes his/her decision. In the decision-making process, he/she decides
his/her one representative strategy at ﬁrst. He/She partially transfers the selected representative strategy to other strategies
in turn, and produces strategies of next generation. The representative strategy itself does not change except the mutation,
where every character of strategies is reversed with uniform probability (1/1000). This process is referred to as the
evolutionary process (also illustrated in Figure 2). Through the decision-making and the evolutionary process, each group
newly generates n strategies, and goes into the match of n rounds for next generation. We repeat above procedure from the
match to the evolutionary process over several generations. The basic PDG with sequential strategy particularly discusses






Figure 2. Illustration of the evolutionary process
The reason for the modiﬁcation of mutation probability from the Ohdaira's model is as follows. Previous study (Ohdaira 2009)
shows that the frequency of mutual cooperation decreases when the number of strategies ( n) or the length of strategy ( L)
increases. This phenomenon is derived from the fact that the evolutionary process becomes less effective in such situations.
Those values ( n and L) are basically not so large in this study, while the number of opponent groups increases a lot (2 to 8
groups). It is a common notion that mutual cooperation is not easily settled when the number of opponents enlarging (Duran
2005, Chen 2007). Therefore, we determine that it is necessary for more effective evolution of cooperation to raise the value
of mutation probability.
The second-best decision
Next, we describe the detail of the second-best decision. We think that the second-best decision is most appropriate for
reproducing the decision with compromise. In this section, ﬁrst we show that previous studies have proposed some
approaches to avoid undesirable situation (Nash equilibrium) in the PDG with the best decision. Second, we denote that there
are some cases where former researches with the best decision cannot explain well. Finally, we propose the second-best
decision as more practical one for the expression of compromise.
As noted in the introduction, while there are some differences of whether rationality is perfect or bounded, the study of
economics or optimization problems generally assumes reactions of humans as the best decision. This is because most
researchers intend to examine why cooperation emerges and develops under the best decision. Naturally, when all players
make their best decision, they reach the state where all players defect one another in the PDG. This situation is referred to as
“Nash equilibrium”, and is undesirable because they have a chance to get higher payoff. Therefore, with the best decision,
mutual cooperation would not develop without additional factor which controls either the range of interaction or the decision of
player.
The factors to escape from Nash equilibrium are tag method (Riolo 1997; Hales 2000; Riolo 2001), network reciprocity (spatial
structure) (Nowak 1992; Cao 1999; Abramson 2001; Ahmed 2002; Kim 2002; Holme 2003; Duran 2005; Vukov 2005; Cassar
2007), indirect reciprocity (Nowak 1998a; Nowak 1998b; Panchanathan 2003; Panchanathan 2004; Nowak 2005; Ohtsuki
2009) for pairwise interactions and costly punishment (Fehr 2002; Fowler 2005; Herrmann 2008; O'Gorman 2009; Rankin
2009) for group interactions. Tag method means that every player can distinguish each other by utilizing his/her identiﬁer. A
player can refer to the tag of another player and know whether he/she is cooperative or not. Network reciprocity deﬁnes
neighborhood connection around players. In that conﬁguration, players interact only with those who are directly connected.
The idea of indirect reciprocity presupposes that every player wants to raise his/her reputation. Free riders (players who
receive social property without any costs) cannot prevail because they have no chance to raise their status. The costly
punishment means that players pay certain cost to punish free riders, which enables players to build mutual trust. This is
suitable to describe advanced modern society with the establishment of law government.
Among those factors, indirect reciprocity seems to be successful at the present moment. However, even the system of
indirect reciprocity cannot achieve cooperation without the following conditions. First, when every player is randomly paired,
players to contribute to society (altruist) increase only when their initial frequency is above the threshold. Second, altruists
should be designed to interact with cooperators rather than defectors. Therefore, altruists are necessary to identify whether
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others are altruistic or not by evaluating opponent reputation. Thus, as indirect reciprocity really requires various conditions for
establishing cooperation, it is not appropriate for all practical situations.
For example, humans occasionally throw away the best choice, and adopt the second-best one to keep good relationships. In
actual negotiations, settlement in purely rational solution is rare. Agreement is more likely to involve compromise. In addition, it
is obvious that not reasonable decision of tendering companies causes the collusive tendering. This is because if they are fully
rational, the ideal situation of mutually presenting higher values should appear and then the collusive tendering will not occur.
Thus, the necessity for the research of non-optimal response has been gradually recognized. Here, we should note that the
model with above each factor is not appropriate for the expression of decision with compromise. Considering those
backgrounds, the recent theoretical researches are likely to adopt except the best decision, i.e., the altruistic decision
(Ohdaira 2006; Ohdaira 2007) or the second-best decision (Rietveld 2007; Boergers 2009; Ohdaira 2009). They compare
those non-optimal responses with the optimal one and also investigate each property. It has emerged as a new trend for the
study regarding social conﬂicts.
In our research, considering that trend, we introduce the second-best decision (Ohdaira 2009) (see Figure 3). The actual
procedure of the second-best decision is as follows. If one group adopts the second-best decision, it always selects the
strategy of the second grade as its representative strategy for the evolutionary process. If all strategies have the same grade,
one strategy is arbitrarily chosen as the representative. Note that the altruistic decision (Ohdaira 2006; Ohdaira 2007) is also
the decision with compromise, and has the concept that every group makes his/her decision without bias excluding the
highest payoff strategy. That is, he/she arbitrarily selects his/her representative strategy from the second to the bottom grade
(see Figure 4). This is suitable for the expression of very strong collusion, but is not the decision to attempt to make some
proﬁt. On the other hand, the second-best decision is aimed at earning proﬁts with certain amount of compromise. Therefore,
we can denote that the second-best decision is more practical than the altruistic decision in the point of the extent of
compromise.




Figure 4. Comparison between the altruistic decision and the second-best decision
Detail of the model
Above description is mainly the explanation for the PDG with sequential strategy between two groups. We extend the match of
two groups to spatial game in this research. Each group located in every node of network plays matches against opponent
groups in turn. Because every group does not play against all other groups, he/she cannot recognize how the decision is
collectively made. However, through matches with directly related opponents, it is possible to grasp the population trends
indirectly with time difference.
In the ﬁrst place, we detail the spatial extension of the PDG with sequential strategy as follows (also see Figure 5). First, we
build two-dimensional network with N nodes that is referred to as ʲ graph or locally connected ring (Watts 1998; Watts 1999),
and assign one group to each node. The number of strategies of each group equals n, and the length of strategy is L
corresponding to the number of bouts. We denote the average connectivity as C_avg, which is usually referred to as the
average degree in the research of spatial network. The structure of the group is the same as the two-group model.
We describe the framework of the spatial PDG with sequential strategy in the following. Taking Figure 5 as the example, at ﬁrst
the group 1 plays the PDG with sequential strategy against the group 2, 3, 9 and 10. In all matches, they mutually utilize each
no.1 ( u =1) strategy. Then, the group 2 plays the game against the group 3, 4, 10 and 1 utilizing each strategy of u =1. Other
groups play the game as well. In the following rounds, every group utilizes the no.2, 3, … ,n strategy in turn.
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Figure 5. Demonstration of the spatial PDG with sequential strategy for regular, N=10, Average Connectivity ( C_avg) is 4
The types of topology of network showing relationships of groups are as follows; the regular, the random and the scale-free.
The idea regarding the randomness of network is based on the Watts' study (Watts 1998; Watts 1999). That is, the
randomness is given by the probability P. If P equals 0, we can classify the network as the regular. As P increases, the
disorder of network gets larger. When P reaches to 1.0, the structure of network becomes completely random (the random
network). Therefore, the probability P means how the network rewires every edge in comparison with the regular, i.e., all
groups change their connections to others with the probability P from the state of order (see Figure 6 above, P=1.0, N=50,
C_avg=8).
The construction of the scale-free network follows to the procedure of the BA model (Barabasi 1999). We can generate a
theoretical model of the scale-free network employing following two processes, i.e., growth and preferential attachment. For
the growth, initially we prepare m0number of nodes, and then continuously add one node with m (≤ m0) number of edges to the
network. Note that this process of new connections does not duplicate existing edges. The preferential attachment means that
this new connection is based on the probability corresponding to each connectivity of existing nodes. We can express this
probability ʠ(ki) that newly added node connects to the node i with connectivity ki as the following equation (3). Thus, this
method aims at modelling continuously growing network. However, in our study, for the comparison with the regular and the
random, the growth halts when the number of all nodes reaches N (in the case of N =50 and C_avg=8, m0=9 and m=4, also




Figure 6. Demonstration of constructed networks of N=50, C_avg=8. The above ﬁgure shows the case of the random, and
the below exhibits the scale-free structure. We also designate each property of networks in the right graph, i.e., degree
distribution, average degree ( C_avg), SD of degree, characteristic path length ( CPL) and clustering coefﬁcient ( CC)
As noted before, groups who have direct connections with edges mutually play games. When speciﬁcally expressed, in the u -
th round all groups face others with relationships utilizing their u -th strategies. The rounds are the ﬁrst, second, third... and
then the n -th is the last round. Every group plays against all neighborhoods and at the end actualizes utilizing all resulting
values of payoff. We can numerically express the averaged payoff of each strategy of the group i, i.e., Pij (u) at the generation
g with the equation (4) utilizing the equations (1) and (2). The number of edges of the group i is Ei and the collection of his/her
opponent groups is Oi. This averaged payoff of the strategy is ﬁrst brought to the group in the end of round against all
neighborhoods. Until then, each group cannot know the payoff of his/her strategy. Note that the Pij (u) is rounded off to the ﬁrst
decimal place and then saved as an integer value in the program code.
(4)
After whole groups ﬁnish their all matches of the PDG with sequential strategy, they separately make the decision, i.e., select
their representative strategies. As described before, in the PDG with sequential strategy, different from the iterated PDG,
every group does not explicitly refer to past strategies of others. However, each group can recognize the direction of others
as the informed payoff, and it is certainly reﬂected in the decision. All groups somewhat restrain their desire to get higher
payoff and decide their representative strategies with the second-best decision. Then, each group generates new n strategies
of next generation. We refer to both the decision and the evolution of strategy as the evolutionary process again. Through the
evolutionary process, all groups update their strategies and are ready for matches of next generation. We deﬁne a set of
procedures followed by the match, the decision and the evolutionary process as one generation. Then, to grasp general
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characteristics of system, one simulation lasts until the number of generations reaches to 1,000. All results exhibited later are
the average from 30 runs of simulation.
 Results
We ﬁrst determine whether the second-best decision actually establishes cooperation between groups. In addition, it is
examined how changes in the structure of network (topology) affect every average frequency of mutual defection and
cooperation between groups. As noted in the detail of the model, our study adopts three different types of topology, which are
the regular, the random and the scale-free. For the following descriptions, ﬁrstly we deﬁne the original parameters as (
C_avg=8, n=8, L=10, N=50), and will compare results of other parameters with this original case. Every average frequency of
all ﬁgures shows the average times of mutual defection or cooperation regarding all groups. We can also ﬁnd each average
rate of mutual defection or cooperation by dividing those frequencies with the length of the strategy L.
Figure 7 shows the results of simulation up to 1,000 generations with original parameters. We can see from the results that the
average frequency of mutual defection is roughly low (a) and every system reaches to highly cooperative state at the last
generation in all types of topology (b). Contemplating the results, there seems no apparent difference among the regular, the
random and the scale-free. However, in the scale-free, the average frequency of mutual cooperation in intermediate
generations is a little larger than other cases. For example, investigating each average frequency of mutual cooperation from
300 to 400 generations, that value for the regular is 6.68ﾱ0.098 and that for the random is 6.69ﾱ0.094, while that of the scale-
free exhibits 6.78ﾱ0.085. Therefore, we cannot state that there is a signiﬁcant difference in each value; however, certainly the
value of the scale-free is slightly higher than others. Interestingly, in all cases, the average frequency of mutual defection
becomes beyond the average frequency of mutual cooperation at initial (until 50) generations. However, the average
frequency of mutual cooperation increases shortly and then exceeds the average frequency of mutual defection.
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Figure 7. This ﬁgure shows the dependence of the average frequency of mutual defection (a) and cooperation (b) on three
types of topology
Why that phenomenon happens can be explained as follows. First, in initial generations, strategies of each group are not so
uniform. And because the second-best decision includes the pursuit of some proﬁt, the average frequency of mutual defection
temporarily increases. As the generation proceeds, similarity between strategies of groups progresses through the
evolutionary process. By this mechanism, the second-best decision gradually works well, and the average frequency of
mutual cooperation starts to increase because all groups do not pursue their immediate interests.
To indicate that this explanation is correct, we proceed to further examination. We employ both the regular and the scale-free
for this theme. We perform the experiment introducing following ﬁve types of parameters:
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2. only the average connectivity is half ( C_avg=4),
3. only the number of strategy is half ( n=4),
4. only the length of strategy is enlarged three times ( L=30) and
5. only the number of groups is enlarged four times ( N=200).
Then, we obtain Figure 8 as the result of this experiment. Contemplating the result, there is very little change regarding the
case of N=200 for each types of topology. We observe not signiﬁcant but a little change (slightly higher than the original case)
when the average connectivity is half ( C_avg=4). This characteristic follows a common knowledge that cooperation is easy to
be settled when the number of opponents decreases as noted in the description regarding the modiﬁcation of mutation
probability. From those results, we can state that the scale of network does not affect the construction of cooperation, and that
the second-best decision universally facilitates cooperation. Note again that the average rate of mutual defection and
cooperation can be found by dividing each average frequency with L.
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Figure 8. Every average frequency of mutual cooperation regarding ﬁve different parameters in the regular (a) and the
scale-free (b)
On the other hand, in the case of L=30, the evolution of cooperation is slower than all cases (Original, C_avg=4, n=4 and
N=200) in both the regular and the scale-free. This trend is the same as the former study (Ohdaira 2009), which shows that
the decline of mutual cooperation occurs when the strategy lengthens. Here, we should note that the average rate of mutual
cooperation regarding the scale-free is higher than that of the regular in intermediate generations. The difference is signiﬁcant
with the level of 0.05 as shown in Figure 8. Therefore, we can state that the facilitative effect of the scale-free structure on
mutual cooperation works better in long length of strategy.




increase of mutual defection in early generations for each topology. Because the fewer number of strategies reduces
variations of strategies and increases similarity, suppressive effect of the second-best decision for near future proﬁt works
well from initial generations. That is, the increase in similarity between strategies effectively facilitates cooperation. This result
shows the validity of the former explanation.
However, looking carefully at Figure 8 again, we can see that the average frequency of mutual cooperation of the case of n=4
in the last generation is lower in comparison with the original value. Moreover, that difference is signiﬁcant. This is because
similarity between strategies works in reverse. When the system reaches around the last generation, strategies of each group
are nearly identical. The evolutionary process effectively rewrites strategies at this stage when groups have many strategies
since they are not completely the same. While in case with small number of strategies, similarity between strategies of groups
increases and also strategies change little through the evolutionary process. Then, in the case of small n, the evolution of
strategies around the last generation generally depends on the mutation of very low probability. Therefore, the system having
small n leads to the slow evolution of cooperation. Note that even in above two cases ( L=30 and n=4) whole groups eventually
converge into the state of almost complete cooperation when the number of generations is tripled (i.e. from 1,000 to 3,000).
 Discussion
Time series ﬂuctuation of each frequency (with the original structure of scale-free)
From above results, we have thought that it is necessary to determine how each group varies every average frequency of
mutual defection and cooperation in time series especially in the case of the scale-free. By investigating this, we can ﬁnd
whether all groups accordantly vary every frequency or there are some groups which behave differently from the whole. This
investigation employs the following parameters ( C_avg=8, n=8, L=30, N=50), which the difference between the regular and the
scale-free in facilitation of cooperation emerges as shown in Figure 8. In the actual experiment, we ﬁrst extract some groups
according to their connectivity, and construct two parties. Then, we probe each average frequency of mutual defection (D)
and cooperation (C) between every party. The classiﬁcation of parties is as follows; 1: groups with the smallest number of
edges (D_Min, C_Min), 2: groups with the largest number of edges (D_Max, C_Max). Certainly, in addition to those, we also
exhibit the behavior of every average frequency of all groups (D_All, C_All).
We show the result of this investigation in Figure 9. This ﬁgure is extracted four simulation runs of all 30 times within initial (up
to 100) generations. The reason why not ﬁnding the average of all simulation runs is because it causes the difﬁculty in
determining the difference of every frequency between parties. That is derived from the fact that the evolution of strategy is
quite different between each simulation run because strategies of the ﬁrst generation are always randomly initialized.
Contemplating the result, as the overall trend, groups with the minimum connectivity gradually reduce the average frequency
of mutual defection. On the other hand, those groups steadily increase the average frequency of mutual cooperation. Also,
D_Min and C_Min are nearly equal to D_All and C_All respectively due to the property of the scale-free structure (i.e. the
number of groups with the minimum connectivity is quite large). As the evolutionary process increases similarity between
strategies of groups, D_Min and D_All decrease after initial generations, while C_Min and C_All increase as noted in the
description of Figure 8.




Figure 9a - d. Each average frequency regarding 3 categorized parties of groups in the scale-free network with following
parameters ( C_avg=8, n=8, L=30, N=50)
However, interestingly, groups with the maximum connectivity indicate the different behaviour from all other groups. Those
groups of maximum connectivity basically do not move in conjunction with all population, and show no change until they
experience some generations, which is especially observed in the simulation no.9 (9d). As remarkably seen in no.1 (9a) and 8
(9c) simulations, groups with the maximum connectivity rapidly increase C_Max and contrarily reduce D_Max when the
difference between values of C_All and D_All becomes near 2. Looking at those trends, groups with the maximum connectivity
are likely to play a role ﬁguring out which direction the entire population evolves to (either defection or cooperation). Groups of
the maximum connectivity do not change their frequency any more until the system decides the direction of evolution.
However, considering that they rapidly change their frequency once the system determines the direction, we can state that
they supervise the settlement of decision among most groups.
Discussion on the analogy between the presented model and the actual tendering
In this section, we discuss the issue that the presented model is analogous to what phenomenon in the real world. Our
research proposes that humans actually do not make the best decision in all cases and there are some situations of
employing the second-best decision. Then, we utilize the PDG with sequential strategy rather than the iterated PDG and
extend it from the match limited in two groups to multiple matches with many groups. In the following descriptions, we state that
this extended spatial PDG with sequential strategy is analogous to the tendering recently dispensed in Japan. We explain our
notice regarding that issue.
We think that the bid-rigging problem is derived from the situation that tendering companies try to secure their proﬁt, rather
than radically compete with each other. The decision of tendering companies generally has some compromise than the best
decision. Therefore, we can interpret collusive tendering as mutual cooperation with those companies with the second-best
decision. As you may know, researchers have already attempted theoretically to approach the mechanism resulting in
collusive tendering utilizing auction theory (Graham 1987; McAfee 1992), game theory (Tanimoto 2003) and experimental
economics (Saijo 1996). However, there have been no former studies taking the sentiment of tendering companies with
compromise into account.
Here, ﬁrstly we create the abstracted tendering game based on the actual tendering in Japan when the government dispenses
the tendering to sell its asset. In the basic conﬁguration of that tendering, bidders individually present their propositions for
multiple tendering properties in single bid. Considering the estimated market price for each subject (Price of assumption: a),
bidders can present similar amount which seems to be proﬁtable and their opponents probably submit as well (Price of safety:
s). They can also strategically present higher amount (Price of challenge: c) than others. When we regard to present higher
amount as “strategically outwitting opponent (Defection)” and also to present expected similar amount to others as “proposing
the same amount as opponent (Cooperation)”, we can simplify the tendering strategies and treat the tendering as a game for
the 2ￗ2 payoff matrix (see Figure 10 and Table 1).
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Figure 10. Illustration regarding the practice of the tendering game
Payoff of this game is given in the following way (also see Table 1). When a bidder can outwit his/her opponent unilaterally,
he/she gains the highest payoff because of the expected acquisition of the property. In this case, he/she has additional points
ʵ for the successful challenge, and then his/her payoff will be a-c+ ʵ. In the case of the same choice of each other, either
he/she or the other has the property with equal probability. In this situation, by presenting strategic price, ʵ is imposed as a
penalty when it failed. Thus, presenting similar amount of the other is preferable because of low loss. When he/she is
completely outwitted, his/her payoff is zero and he/she cannot get anything. As there are several properties for tendering,
his/her actual payoff is ﬁnally for the sum of the individual payoff of each property. Taking Figure 10 as the example, the payoff
of the proposition (=strategy) for the opponent can be found as follows:(a-c+ʵ)+0+{(a-c)/2-ʵ}=(a-c)/2. When we set those
parameters(a, c, s, ʵ)=(10, 6, 4, 1), the payoff matrix is completely the same as A in the equation (2) and we can employ the
knowledge of this study for the analogy to the real tendering. Note that it is essential for reproducing this speciﬁc situation that
bidders set values to various properties of tendering at once. Therefore, it is impossible to employ the framework of general




Table 1. Payoff matrix of the tendering game
Secondly, utilizing the presented model, we represent groups as bidders (business companies) on each node of two-
dimensional network of relationships. Bidders play matches between bidders who are directly related only. Each bidder
presents different strategies for n rounds (corresponding to the number of strategies n), and knows every average payoff in
the end of round against all neighborhoods. Matches between groups of relationships can be recognized as channeling intent
of groups because they can acquire some information from matches as resulting averaged payoff of each strategy. We can
assume the above scenario as the framework that bidders can repeatedly submit their tendering propositions in ﬁxed terms
like the internet auctions. His/Her strategy contains values for each property (the L number of tendering properties,
corresponding to multiple choices of D or C regarding each bout). They make the second-best decision after ﬁnishing all
matches. In this framework of tendering, as the government conducting the tendering intends to sell its asset with making
much more proﬁt, it wishes for the situation where bidders mutually propose higher amounts for all L number of tendering
properties (which corresponds to the situation of mutual defection in L times for the PDG with sequential strategy).
However, in the reverse of what the government expects, bidders eventually reach the state of collusion, i.e., high level mutual
cooperation as shown in the previous result (see Figure 7). Construction of this state is hardly affected by the topology of
network. On the other hand, relationships of the scale-free structure effectively enhance collusion when the number of
tendering properties (= the length of strategy, L) is large. The increase of similarity between strategies (decrease in the
number of strategies n) also has an effect on the promotion of collusion in early generations (see Figure 8). However, it
induces slow evolution of collusion because of that similarity as well.
Comparison to existing studies of spatial game and collusion
In this section, we describe the position of our work in comparison with previous studies based on physics and theoretical
works of collusion. We ﬁrst compare the ﬁndings obtained in past researches on spatial game with the results of our study.
Generally in the case of multiple opponent groups, relationships of groups are usually deﬁned by two-dimensional network
(Nowak 1992; Cao 1999; Abramson 2001; Ahmed 2002; Kim 2002; Holme 2003; Duran 2005; Santos 2005; Vukov 2005;
Santos 2006; Ohdaira 2006; Cassar 2007; Perc 2008; Santos 2008) like our study. It has been previously revealed that the
difference in the density and topology regarding the network affects the existence ratio of non-cooperative player (Abramson
2001), and the small-world relationships of groups achieve cooperation most rapid (Masuda 2003). However, in those
researches, types of strategy are quite limited (simply two strategies, All-C and All-D) in order to focus only on the structure of
network. Moreover, the decision is basically the optimal response (best decision). Then, it has recently become common
notion that the heterogeneity of network, especially the scale-free structure, facilitates cooperation (Santos 2005; Santos
2006; Perc 2008; Santos 2008) as noted in the introduction. Those studies also have some simpliﬁcation as seen in the payoff
matrix, where temptation to defect takes the value between 1 and 2 (1≤T≤2), R=1 and P=S=0. They introduce the optimal
response as well. Of course, as noted in the introduction, coevolution between strategy and structure has also proved to be








Segbroeck 2009; Perc 2010).
Unlike those studies, our research has more complex form of strategy. However, as previous studies, we also obtain the
result that the relationships of the scale-free structure effectively promote mutual cooperation in the case of large L. This effect
is almost unaffected by changes in the density of relationships or the number of total groups. On the other hand, the extent of
facilitation of cooperation is smaller than previous studies with optimal response, and also little changes occur by the
stochastic perturbation to relationships. We can assume that this is because there is no direct reference to other
representative strategies between groups. The effect of inter-group reference is our future work.
Second, regarding the research which deals with the corruption in the tendering, there have already been some theoretical
studies as we described in the previous section. However, we can ﬁnd no former studies introducing the second-best decision
for the expression of the sentiment of collusive bidders. When talking on the structure of typical business relationships, it has
proved to be the small world (Kogut 2001;Davis 2003). However, because our study shows that the small world has little effect
for mutual cooperation (collusion), we consider that the actual relationships between bid-rigging companies are rather close to
the scale-free. In other words, we can assume that the relationships between collusive ﬁrms have few groups conducting
collusion like hub nodes. Actually, previous studies (Saijo 1996; Tanimoto 2003) indicate that the existence of some companies
organizing collusive tendering is necessary for efﬁcient construction of collusion. We also observe the process that the hub
groups ascertain the trend of population and then those groups lead the all after the whole direction of decision determines. It
is quite interesting that it becomes clear that those hubs play that function while we do not give them an explicit role of the
leader of collusion.
Comparing knowledge of social science studies with that of physics based researches
As our study is basically founded on the physical point of view, we have not addressed the knowledge of social science
studies. Then, in the following we exhibit some formal modelling papers in the literature that draw heavily on social science
theory and empirical examples from speciﬁc application areas. We also describe the correlation of obtained knowledge
between those studies and researches of physics.
Raub and Weesie (Raub and Weesie 1990) compare the systems between “atomized interactions” (without receiving
information on their partners' behaviour) and “perfectly embedded” (immediately receiving information) excluding effects of
reputation. It shows that efﬁciency is more easily attained as a result of individually rational behaviour in perfectly embedded
systems. We think this discussion is similar to the system with costly punishment in group interactions (Fehr 2002; Fowler
2005; Herrmann 2008; O'Gorman 2009; Rankin 2009) because in such system whether punishing others or not is based on
information of their past acts. Our model can be classiﬁed as the atomized interactions at present because of no inter-group
reference to other representative strategies. The study (Macy 1993) is also the same discussion as costly punishment, and
experiments the ability of various sanctioning regimes to generate cooperation as well as resist stampedes that risk over
cooperation and needless sacriﬁce. It shows that external moral sanctions produce too little cooperation, while internalized
sanctions produce too much.
The research (Oliver and Marwell 1988) shows that the positive effects of group size increase with group heterogeneity and
non-random social ties. Buskens' study (Buskens 1998) derives hypotheses on the effects of density, outdegree centrality,
and centralization on the level of trust. It concludes that higher density and outdegree induce more trust, and that centralization
increases trust if it is “well organized”, i.e., actors who can place more trust are central in the network. Chwe's study (Chwe
1999) employs the scenario that each person in a group is completely rational and wants to participate only if the total number
of participants is at least his/her threshold. It shows that position of network is much more crucial in affecting the revolt of
people with low thresholds than those with high ones. Gould's research (Gould 1993) constructs a mathematical model
describing the relationship between individual contributions to a collective good and the network of social relations making
these contributions interdependent. It shows that network density and size differently inﬂuence collective action outcomes,
depending on the structural position of those who make unconditional contributions.
We can state from the aspect of physics study that the research (Oliver and Marwell 1988) and Buskens' research (Buskens
1998) correspond to the fact that hub nodes in the scale-free relationships facilitate cooperation (Santos 2005; Santos 2006;
Perc 2008; Santos 2008) because those are also centralized and that structure is “well organized”. As our study has no direct
reference to strategies of others, facilitative effect of the scale-free is relatively smaller than those previous researches as
shown in the results. The research (Gould 1993) and Chwe's study (Chwe 1999) are similar to the knowledge of Kim et al.
(Kim 2002) that introduces an inﬂuential node (defector) for dynamic instability.
Macy (Macy 1991a) introduces a learning-theoretic speciﬁcation for a structural analysis, and shows that threshold effects
may be the key to solving the coordination problem. When individual choices are contingent on participation by others, this
interdependence facilitates the coordination of contributions needed to shift the bistable system from a noncooperative
equilibrium to a cooperative one. These chain reactions require bridges that link socially distant actors in networks with low-
density. We can assume that this study offers the same knowledge as the facilitative effect of the small world (Watts 1999;
Masuda 2003) because we can address “bridges” as short-cuts by rewiring for the small world network. Also, Macy's
research (Macy 1991b) reformulates the Prisoner's Dilemma as a stochastic learning model in which the behaviour of
interdependent actors is continually shaped by sanctions and cues generated by their interaction. It shows that how the





need to reduce the number of choices that must be fortuitously coordinated in order to escape noncooperative equilibrium. We
have demonstrated in the results that the small length of strategy ( L=10, i.e. a few choices) enhances cooperation than the
case of large L ( L=30, i.e. many choices). This outcome is similar to above description of the necessity for cooperation that
the number of choices accidentally coordinated to escape defection should be reduced.
 Conclusion
In this research, utilizing the model of spatial agent based simulation, we have studied the property of cooperation based on
the second-best decision (i.e. some compromise). This model is also the motif of the actual bid recently dispensed in Japan
and represents the sentiment of bidders when collusion occurs. Our model utilizes the spatial PDG with sequential strategy,
and its features are summarized as follows. First, groups corresponding to bidders have partial relationships which are
denoted as two-dimensional network. Second, all groups play the spatial PDG with sequential strategy to each opponent group
of relationships.
The main characteristic of the spatial PDG with sequential strategy is that the strategy has no restriction in its variety, and
evolves as the generation proceeds. Each group can know opponents' direction of decision implicitly by payoff informed at the
end of every round. We express relationships of groups as various types of network (with the same average connectivity).
When every group with some strategies plays the spatial PDG with sequential strategy and makes his/her second-best
decision over some generations, we observe mutual cooperation (i.e. collusive tendering).
It turns out by further inspection that in the scale-free network the average frequency of mutual cooperation increases faster
than the regular case when the length of strategy L is large. The trend that the evolution of mutual cooperation becomes
slower when strategy lengthens is the same as the one observed in the model of two groups (Ohdaira 2009). It is also implied
that the scale-free structure universally has an effect on the promotion of cooperation, because changes in the density of
relationships and the total number of groups almost do not affect that facilitative effect. This result corresponds with the
obtained knowledge of some researches utilizing simpler game mechanism (Santos 2005; Santos 2006; Perc 2008; Santos
2008). On the other hand, similarity between strategies increases when we reduce the number of strategies of groups. In this
case, the settlement of the collective direction becomes premature, while the rate of evolution of mutual cooperation gets
slower.
In addition, the major difference is as follows when addressing our work from the point of view of studies dealing with collusion.
While the applied research of game theory (Tanimoto 2003) has added the proﬁt obtained by collusion to the payoff matrix, we
think the cause of collusion comes from the decision of bidders. As stated in the discussion, we believe that collusion occurs
because bidders do not gain excessive proﬁt and they focus on relationships with other companies. Beneﬁts of maintaining
relationships with someone are more natural to express as decision in our study rather than prescribed payoff matrix. With
regard to the prevention of collusion, we think it to be effective that the government agency supervises companies of tendering
not to construct the hub (leader of collusion), or makes bidders present their propositions over and over again. The latter
corresponds to the increase in the number of strategies ( n), and we can expect that this generates the reverse effect from
the case of decreasing n (see Figure 8). From the results of previous research (Ohdaira 2009), we think that the effective
value of n for suppressing cooperation (collusion) is 32 or larger. In the future, we especially proceed to further examination
regarding the issue of whether stochastic perturbation produces differences in results when the mechanism of inter-group
reference to other representative strategies is available.
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 Note
Further information and model code are available from the ﬁrst author and Windowsﾮ executable version can be downloaded.
 Appendix: pseudo code regarding main routine
Function Main:
Start:
  // Starting simulation.
  for number_of_generations (<= 1,000):
    // Executing all matches.
    for rounds (<= number_of_strategies, n):
      for group_id (<= number_of_groups, N):
        Play_Match (rounds, group_id):
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    end for:
    // Executing evolutionary process.
    for group_id (<= number_of_groups, N):
      Update_Strategy (group_id):
    end for:
  end for:
End:
Function Play_Match (Rounds, Group_ID):
Start:
  // Every group plays the PDG with sequential strategy against his/her opponent groups
  // mutually utilizing each strategy of the same id.
  // The number of total game is equal to the number of opponent groups.
  // The number of opponent groups is all the same (regular) or
  // varies following the structure of relationships (random, scale free).
  // Initializing the number of opponent groups
  number_of_opponent_groups = 0;
  // This group matches the group(s) of direct relationship(s).
  for group_id (<= number_of_groups, N)
    if (the group of group_id has direct relationship with this group) then:
      number_of_opponent_group = number_of_opponent_group + 1;
      opponent_group_id = group_id;
      // Starting the match of the PDG with sequential strategy
      for bouts (<= length_of_strategy, L):
        if Strategy[Group_ID][Rounds][bouts] == D and
         Strategy[opponent_group_id][Rounds][bouts] == C then:
          Score[Group_ID][Rounds]
           = Score[Group_ID][Rounds] + 5:
        end if:
        else if Strategy[Group_ID][Rounds][bouts] == C and
         Strategy[opponent_group_id][Rounds][bouts] == C then:
          Score[Group_ID][Rounds]
           = Score[Group_ID][Rounds] + 3:
        end else if:
        else if Strategy[Group_ID][Rounds][bouts] == D and
         Strategy[opponent_group_id][Rounds][bouts] == D then:
          Score[Group_ID][Rounds]
           = Score[Group_ID][Rounds] + 1:
        end else if:
        else:
          Score[Group_ID][Rounds]
           = Score[Group_ID][Rounds] + 0:
        end else:
      end for:
    end if:
  end for:
  // Final score regarding the strategy of this group is the average of all matches.
  // Note that each score is rounded off to the first decimal place and then
  // saved as an integer value.
  Score[Group_ID][Rounds]




  // This group grades all strategies by their score.
  Grade_Strategy:
  // He/She selects the strategy of the second grade as the representative strategy,
  // and also decides the representative strategy ID.
  representative_strategy_id = strategy_id (of the second grade strategy):
  // Note that both values of the length_of_fraction_1 (Lf1) and
  // the length_of_fraction_2 (Lf2) are randomly changes in every step.
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  // This group partly duplicates the representative strategy to every strategy.
  for number of strategies (<= n, except the representative strategy ID):
    for bouts_1 (<= Lf1):
      Strategy[Group_ID][number of strategies][bouts_1]
       = Strategy[Group_ID][representative_strategy_id][bouts_1]:
    end for:
    for bouts_2 (Lf2 <= bouts_2 <= L):
      Strategy[Group_ID][number_of_strategies][bouts_2]
       = Strategy[Group_ID][representative_strategy_id][bouts_2]:
    end for:
  end for:
  // This group executes the process of mutation for every strategy.
  for number_of_strategies (<= n):
    for bouts (<= L):
      if (a value randomly generated is over the threshold) then:
        if Strategy[Group_ID][number_of_strategies][bouts] == C then:
          Strategy[Group_ID][number_of_strategies][bouts] = D:
        end if:
        else:
          Strategy[Group_ID][number_of_strategies][bouts] = C:
        end else:
      end if:
    end for:
  end for:
End:
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